Book Note: The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice, by Lee Epstein, William M Landes, and Richard A Posner by Seddigh, Mohsen
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 51, Issue 2 (Winter 2014) Article 14
Book Note: The Behavior of Federal Judges: A
Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational
Choice, by Lee Epstein, William M Landes, and
Richard A Posner
Mohsen Seddigh
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Note
This Book Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode
Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Seddigh, Mohsen. "Book Note: The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice, by Lee Epstein,




THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE, by Lee Epstein, 
William M Landes, and Richard A Posner1
HOW AND WHY DO judges decide a case one way or another? Three prominent 
contemporary legal scholars address this puzzling question. The analysis builds 
upon a strain of legal realism advocated by Judge Posner.2 He distances himself 
from both legalism and traditional legal realism. Instead, by drawing upon 
economics’ contribution to the realistic theory of judicial behaviour, Posner 
seeks to create a model of rational response to preferences and aversions not 
limited to legalism and ideology.3 Under this theory, which the authors call 
“‘the realist approach,”4 the judge is viewed as a labour market participant 
(i.e., a worker or, more precisely, a government employee with self-interested 
behaviour). Viewing the courtroom as a workplace, the authors step beyond the 
widely discussed factors of ideology and legalistic analysis to test hypotheses created 
on elements such as effort aversion, workload, conformity, and group and political 
polarization. Chapter one elaborates on this theory, while chapter two reviews the 
existing empirical literature on judicial behaviour. 
The bulk of the study is found in chapters three through eight. In chapter 
three, the authors study the Supreme Court of the United States (“USSC”), and 
they find confirmation of the general notion that ideology plays a significant 
1. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013) 422 pages.
2. Ibid at 25-26. See also Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010); Richard A Posner, “Some Realism about Judges: a Reply to Edwards and 
Livemore” (2010) 59:6 Duke LJ 1177; and Richard A Posner, “Realism about Judges” (2011) 
105:2 Nw UL Rev 577.
3. Supra note 1 at 29.
4. Ibid at 5.
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role in the justices’ decision making. At the same time, however, the authors 
suggest that a separate analysis in more than 30 percent of unanimous decisions 
in the USSC can indicate that, at times, the ideological divide fades in the face of 
factors such as dissent aversion. 
Chapter four analyzes judicial behaviour in courts of appeals, finding that 
while ideology plays a non-negligible role in decision-making, its effect is more 
diluted than in the USSC. Effort aversion plays a greater role in these courts 
because of their heavier workloads. In the same vein, in chapter five, the authors 
find that ideology plays a yet smaller part in federal district courts than in either 
courts of appeals or the USSC. 
Chapters six, seven, and eight deal with topics that can be extended to judges 
in all three tiers of the US federal judiciary. These topics are dissent aversion 
(chapter six), the questioning of lawyers at oral argument (chapter seven), and the 
federal judges’ hopes for higher appointment and promotion (chapter eight).  
The book aims to make four contributions: first, empirically test a distinct 
judicial behaviour theory; second, expand existing American databases; third, use 
regression analysis rather than simple correlation to be able to separately estimate 
the effect of different variables such as ideology and workload; and fourth, examine 
a broader scope of courts than most previous studies. However—as expected, and 
acknowledged by the authors—the book is far from exhaustive.5 The authors 
point at other questions to be put to test, and make various suggestions regarding 
areas that can be further scrutinized such as courts and tribunals other than those 
considered in this study.
This is a book from which any legal researcher and student interested in 
judicial behaviour, litigator, or judge in Canada or elsewhere, would benefit. Not 
only does its quantitative approach distinguish it from many previous studies, 
but the questions posited, the underlying theory that gives rise to those questions, 
and the scope of the analysis make it unique. Whether for research or recreational 
reading, it prompts stimulating ideas in accessible prose. 
5. Ibid at 7.
